Twitter Updates

    follow me on Twitter

    Tuesday, December 2, 2008

    Cost-Benefit Analysis for Drugs...

    Makes lots of sense...

    g

    -----

    EVIDENCE GAP

    British Balance Gain Versus Cost of Latest Drugs

    Published: December 2, 2008

    RUISLIP, England — When Bruce Hardy’s kidney cancer spread to his lung, his doctor recommended an expensive new pill from Pfizer. But Mr. Hardy is British, and the British health authorities refused to buy the medicine. His wife has been distraught.

    Hazel Thompson for The New York Times

    Bruce and Joy Hardy of Ruislip, England, left, are awaiting a British agency’s reconsideration of its rejection of a medicine sought by Mr. Hardy, a kidney cancer patient.

    The Evidence Gap

    Setting a Price on Life

    Articles in this series will explore medical treatments used despite scant proof they work and will consider steps toward medicine based on evidence.

    All Articles in the Series »
    Steve Forrest/Insight-Visual, for The New York Times

    Dr. Michael Rawlins, the chairman of the agency, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence.

    “Everybody should be allowed to have as much life as they can,” Joy Hardy said in the couple’s modest home outside London.

    If the Hardys lived in the United States or just about any European country other than Britain, Mr. Hardy would most likely get the drug, although he might have to pay part of the cost. A clinical trial showed that the pill, called Sutent, delays cancer progression for six months at an estimated treatment cost of $54,000.

    But at that price, Mr. Hardy’s life is not worth prolonging, according to a British government agency, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. The institute, known as NICE, has decided that Britain, except in rare cases, can afford only £15,000, or about $22,750, to save six months of a citizen’s life.

    British authorities, after a storm of protest, are reconsidering their decision on the cancer drug and others.

    For years, Britain was almost alone in using evidence of cost-effectiveness to decide what to pay for. But skyrocketing prices for drugs and medical devices have led a growing number of countries to ask the hardest of questions: How much is life worth? For many, NICE has the answer.

    Top health officials in Austria, Brazil, Colombia and Thailand said in interviews that NICE now strongly influences their policies.

    “All the middle-income countries — in Eastern Europe, Central and South America, the Middle East and all over Asia — are aware of NICE and are thinking about setting up something similar,” said Dr. Andreas Seiter, a senior health specialist at the World Bank.

    Even in the United States, rising costs have led some in Congress to propose an institute that would compare the effectiveness of new medical technologies, although the proposals so far would not allow for price considerations. At the present rate of growth, medical costs will increase to 25 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product in 2025 from 16 percent, with half of the increase coming from new drugs and devices, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

    To arrest this trend, the United States needs to adopt at least some of NICE’s methods, said Dr. Mark McClellan and Dr. Sean Tunis, who served earlier in the Bush administration as, respectively, administrator and chief medical officer of the Center for Medicare and MedicaidServices. Dr. Tunis said he spent a lot of time in government “learning about NICE and trying to adopt the processes and mechanisms they used, and we just couldn’t.”

    That’s because the idea of using price to determine which drugs or devices Medicare or Medicaid provides has provoked fierce protests. But Dr. McClellan said the American government would soon have no choice.

    Drug and device makers, which once routinely denounced the British for questioning product prices, have begun quietly slashing prices in Britain to gain NICE’s coveted approval, especially because other nations are following the institute’s lead. Companies have said that they will consult with NICE to help determine which experimental compounds enter the final stage of clinical trials, so the British agency’s officials will soon influence which drugs enter the market in the United States.

    The British government created NICE a decade ago to ensure that every pound spent buys as many years of good-quality life as possible, but the agency is increasingly rejecting expensive treatments. The denials have led to debate over what is to blame: company prices or the health institute’s math.

    Dr. Michael Rawlins, chairman of NICE, blames the industry, saying that some companies raise prices “to get profits up so their executives can get better bonuses.” Dr. Karol Sikora, a prominent London oncologist, said that the institute’s math was flawed and that Dr. Rawlins had a “personal vendetta” against cancer treatments.

    Drug company executives who were interviewed uniformly promised to cooperate with NICE, but industry advocates were not so kind. Robert Goldberg, vice president of the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, an advocacy group financed by drug makers, likened Dr. Rawlins and his institute to terrorists and said their decisions were morally indefensible.

    Developing a Method

    It all started with Viagra.

    Pfizer’s introduction of the drug in 1998 panicked British health officials, who feared it would wreck the government’s health budget. So they placed restrictions on its use. Pfizer sued, claiming the government’s decision was arbitrary. To defend itself against similar claims, the government needed a standard method of rationing. The following year, NICE opened.

    Asked whether he thought the institute would succeed, Frank Dobson, the Labor health minister at the time, famously said, “Probably not, but it’s worth a bloody good try.”

    Britain’s National Health Service provides 95 percent of the nation’s care from an annual budget, so paying for costly treatments means less money for, say, sick children. Before NICE, hospitals and clinics often came to different decisions about which drugs to buy, creating geographic disparities in care that led to outrage. (Such disparities are common in the United States, even for federal Medicare patients.)

    Now, any drug or device approved by the institute must be offered to patients. The institute has also written hundreds of treatment guidelines in hopes of improving, and making more consistent, basic medical care.

    The institute has analyzed the cost-effectiveness of surgical operations, cancer screening tests and medical devices. For example, it found that drug-coated cardiac stents were worth only $450 more than bare-metal ones. In the United States,stent price differences are often far wider.

    Five years ago, the British health institute recommended more emergency room CT scans of patients suffering fromhead trauma — forcing hospitals to buy more machines.

    But the decisions that get the most attention are those involving new drugs. Any drug that provides an extra six months of good-quality life for £10,000 — about $15,150 — or less is automatically approved, while those that give six months for $22,750 or less might get approved. More expensive medicines have been approved only rarely. The spending limits represent the health institute’s best guess for how much the nation can afford.

    After consulting a citizens group, the institute decided that the nation should spend the same amount saving or improving the life of a 75-year-old smoker as it would a 5-year-old.

    ‘Muddling Through’

    The institute’s decision-making process involves a series of independent assessments, consultations with manufacturers, committee meetings, comment periods for outsiders and appeals that, taken together, Dr. Rawlins described as “procedural justice,” or “muddling through elegantly.” While the institute provides advice, decisions are made by one of three committees made up of doctors, nurses and economists from outside the government.

    Transparency recently became a high priority, but gaps in the idea of openness remain. At the institute’s first public decision-making appraisal meeting in September, staff members handed a reporter a stack of documents, only to snatch them back moments later. The committee’s chairman, Dr. David Barnett, was so intent on keeping the meeting brief that he told a committee member: “This must be the last question. It must be relevant. Otherwise, you will feel my wrath.”

    To analyze the value of the drug that Mr. Hardy, the kidney cancer patient, wanted, and the value of three other kidney cancer medicines, the British institute hired a university group that considered how many months the drugs delayed cancer’s progress.

    Firestorm of Protest

    The academics got drug prices and calculated the costs of administering them and treating their side effects. Not one of the drugs came close to being worth their expense, the group suggested. In a preliminary ruling in August, a committee from NICE agreed.

    The decision caused a firestorm. Twenty-six prominent British oncologists wrote a letter to The Sunday Times saying that the institute assessed cancer treatments poorly and that patients were remortgaging their homes to buy drugs freely available in other countries.

    Given that fewer than 6,000 people per year in England and Wales are diagnosed with kidney cancer, “Why put ourselves through so much heartache for very little money?” Andrew Dillon, the institute’s chief executive, asked in a September interview. “The answer is that if we don’t apply the same criteria even to small groups of patients, there’s little value to what we do at all.”

    Dr. Sikora, who helped organize the August protest, predicted in a September interview that the institute would buckle under political pressure.

    Flooded with anguished comments, the institute beat a hasty retreat. A preliminary consultation posted Nov. 5 said that the institute would instruct its appraisal committees to consider approving highly expensive life-saving drugs for terminal illnesses affecting fewer than 7,000 patients per year — a policy that seems tailor-made for Sutent and the three other kidney cancer drugs.

    Negotiations with companies on possible discounts are continuing, and a committee is scheduled on Jan. 14 to make public this nascent compromise.

    NICE has stood fast in other areas, though, rejecting Kineret for rheumatoid arthritis and Avonex for multiple sclerosis. In 2001, NICE ruled that Aricept and two other drugs used to treat Alzheimer’s disease were worth their costs only if patients’ conditions had increased from mild to moderate severity.

    The analysis put a value on patients’ improved thinking skills, and possible savings from delayed entry into nursing homes. Instead of pills, the institute suggested more counseling.

    Advocates for patients with Alzheimer’s disease called the decision heartless.

    Dr. Rawlins said he was frustrated that his institute had been censured instead of the drug company executives who set sky-high prices. Take the case of Celgene, the maker of Revlimid, a drug for multiple myeloma, a bone-marrow cancer, that in a preliminary ruling on Oct. 28 the institute said was too costly.

    Celgene’s first big seller was thalidomide, a decades-old medicine now used as a cancer treatment, which is so cheap to manufacture that a company in Brazil sells it for pennies a pill.

    Celgene initially spent very little on research and priced each pill in 1998 at $6. As the drug’s popularity against cancer grew, the company raised the price 30-fold to about $180 per pill, or $66,000 per year. The price increases reflected the medicine’s value, company executives said.

    In 2005, the company introduced Revlimid, a derivative of thalidomide that is supposed to be less toxic, but may be no more effective. Celgene priced it at about $260 per pill, or $94,000 per year.

    Offering Discounts

    Private and public insurers in the United States must pay whatever Celgene and other makers of unique cancer medicines decide to charge, so prices are soaring. Spending on cancer drugs and other such specialty medicines rose 9 percent last year and now represents 24 percent of the nation’s drug bill, according to Health Strategies Group, a New Jersey consulting company. Drug expenses in 2006 grew faster than any other part of the nation’s health bill except home care.

    But because of the institute, Britain’s National Health Service has been among the first to balk at paying such prices, which has led many companies to offer the British discounts unavailable almost anywhere else.

    Johnson & Johnson, for instance, agreed to charge for Velcade, another drug for multiple myeloma, only if tests showed it was effective in a particular patient. Novartis agreed to give free injections of Lucentis, a drug for age-related macular degeneration, if patients needed more than 14 shots. Dr. Rawlins said these deals were constructed by drug makers to hide from other countries the discounts offered in Britain.

    “It’s a good deal for us, but I can’t see that it will work in the long run because I can’t see that others countries will be so dim as to not notice it,” Dr. Rawlins said.

    A more prudent bureaucrat would never make such a remark. Dr. Rawlins said that he delighted in controversy, “although I’ll admit that it doesn’t always work out.” He wears thick glasses and fine suits whose pockets are stuffed with nicotine gum packages that rattle as he walks. He laughs easily, plays the piano and viola, and moves effortlessly between politics and medicine.

    His criticisms of the pharmaceutical industry have sharpened.

    “I want them to produce new drugs for conditions we really need treatments for, but I loathe their marketing practices, which corrupt doctors in a dreadful way,” said Dr. Rawlins, who until recently practiced general medicine and for years was chairman of the British version of the Food and Drug Administration. “And I’m very conscious that the prices the pharmaceutical industry charges are what they think the market will bear.”

    In 10 years, the health institute’s budget has grown to $50 million from $13 million, and it is scheduled to rise to $142 million in four years. NICE has 270 employees, who include doctors, economists and pharmacists.

    Worldwide Impact

    Agencies like NICE are popping up across the globe. Dr. Leonardo Cubillos, Colombia’s national director of insurance, said that Colombia was using British methods to choose drugs for a national health insurance package.

    Membership in an international group of drug and device assessment agencies grew to 45 last year from 8 in 1992. The British institute has created a consulting group to advise foreign governments.

    Much of the reason for this proliferation of agencies is that, while prescription drugs represent just 10.3 percent of overall medical spending in the United States, that share is 17 percent on average in industrialized countries.

    As spending on drugs soared in many nations — often haphazardly — overall health often showed little improvement. So international aid agencies are advising governments to adopt British assessments and deliberations to improve their public’s health while lowering costs, and officials are listening — a trend that is likely to accelerate during the present global economic slowdown.

    The health institutes in both Britain and Germany may soon suggest prices for drugs, a strategy intended to deflect political pressure back on the companies and shorten negotiations that now often take months.

    “We have been told that the price is the price, but the worm is turning now,” Dr. Barnett said.

    Company executives acknowledge that they are increasingly acceding to British demands to slash prices.

    But the most pressing question for the industry is what influence the British institute will have in the United States. The United States already spends more than twice as much per capita on health care as the average of other industrialized nations, while getting generally poorer health outcomes.

    Michael O. Leavitt, the Bush administration’s secretary of health and human services, said in a September speech that, at its present growth rate, health care spending “could potentially drag our nation into a financial crisis that makes our major subprime mortgage crisis look like a warm summer rain.”

    And while there is fierce disagreement about how and whether to control drug and device expenses as part of a broader reform of the health system, many say some cost controls are inevitable. At a September device industry conference in Washington, a seminar on the issue was standing-room only and half of the questioners mentioned NICE.

    John R. Dwyer Jr., a Washington lawyer who represents device makers, said that many in the industry have believed that major changes to control costs in the federal Medicare program were inevitable, and “people see NICE as the only workable paradigm.”

    Meanwhile, Mr. Hardy waits. In recent weeks his growing tumor has pressed on a nerve that governs his voice. He can barely speak and is increasingly out of breath. The Hardys are hoping that in January NICE will approve the use of Sutent, allowing Mr. Hardy further treatment.

    "It’s hard to know that there is something out there that could help but they’re saying you can’t have it because of cost,” said Ms. Hardy, who now speaks for her husband of 45 years. “What price is life?”


    Projected US Doctor Shortage in 2025

    • Medical News: Work Force

    Nation Faces Daunting Doctor Shortage

    Download Complimentary Source PDF
    By Emily P. Walker, Washington Correspondent, MedPage Today
    Published: December 02, 2008
    Reviewed by Zalman S. Agus, MD; Emeritus Professor
    University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine.
    Click here to rate this report
    WASHINGTON, Dec. 2 - Under any set of plausible assumptions, an immense shortage of physicians is impending, according to the Association of American Medical Colleges.

    The shortage is expected to exceed 124,000 physicians by 2025, and it will be most acute in primary care, said a report by Michael J. Dill and Edward S. Salsberg of the AAMC's Center for Workforce Studies.

    "Due to population growth, aging and other factors, demand will outpace supply through at least 2025," they wrote. "Simply educating and training more physicians will not be enough to address these shortages. Complex changes such as improving efficiency, reconfiguring the way some services are delivered, and making better use of our physicians will also be needed."

    The projected shortfall was attributed to a slowly expending physician workforce in the face of an expected 50% growth in the U.S, population and a doubling in patients older than 65.

    Projecting current utilization trends, the report predicted that the demand for physicians would grow 26.3% from 2006 through 2025. It would require 859,300 physicians to meet that demand, but there will only be 734,900-resulting in a shortage of 124,400.

    It was the AAMC's first workforce report since 2006, when it said that a 30% increase in the total number of physicians would be necessary to ward off a major physician shortage.

    In the new report, the largest shortage is projected in primary care and surgical specialties, said the AAMC.

    "There is broad recognition of the central role of primary care in the nation's healthcare delivery system," said the report. "Until recently, though, health workforce projections have largely neglected primary care. Our baseline projections produce a greater shortage in primary care than in any other specialty area. In fact, the projected shortage in primary care accounts for more than a third of the total projected shortage in 2025 (37% of the overall physician shortage, or about 46,000 full-time equivalent primary-care doctors)."

    At the same time, inpatient care will be the setting of greatest need.

    "If current patterns continue, the hospital inpatient setting is projected to experience the single greatest rise in demand (36.6%). All the other settings are projected to face increases that, while still substantial, are notably less than the growth in demand for physicians in inpatient settings. Indeed, surgery is the only other setting with projected cumulative growth in demand that exceeds 25% by 2025. Nonetheless, the projected increase exceeds 20% for every setting."

    That projected shortage was based on current medical trends, but the number could be much higher in the face of shifting trends, such as younger physicians working fewer hours than their older counterparts.

    The report suggested that moving rapidly to provide coverage for all Americans before creating significant improvements in how medical care is delivered could fuel the workforce problem.

    If universal healthcare coverage becomes a reality, overall demand for physicians would go up by 4%, which would increase the shortfall by 25%, or an extra 31,000 physicians.

    While an increase in medical school capacity has been suggested as a way to fill the physician pipeline, the report said that a "robust expansion" of such capacity would only reduce the projected shortage by 43%, which would still equal a deficit of 70,000 physicians.

    "Given these projections, assuring access to healthcare will require more than the expected enrollment increase in U.S. medical schools and an expansion in graduate medical education," the report said. "Increasing the number of U.S. doctors is necessary, but it will not be sufficient."

    The report added, "Shortages are likely to be manifested in a number of ways, some subtle and some not. This includes longer waiting times for appointments, increased travel distances to get care, shorter visit times with physicians, expanded use of non-physicians for care, and higher prices. If shortages are extensive, in some cases it will lead to a loss of access altogether."

    In addition to increasing medical school capacity, the report suggested a number of shortage-mitigating factors including:

    • Efforts to use non-physician clinicians and other health professionals to improve productivity
    • Promotion of flexible scheduling, including allowing part-time work
    • Recruitment of minorities into medical school, because studies show they are more likely to work in underserved areas, which are predicted to be hit hardest by the shortage
    • Improvement of data collection and workforce studies.

    In addition to the authors, the report cited substantial contributions made by Timothy Dall, Vice President at The Lewin Group, Atul Grover, M.D., Director of Government Relations at AAMC, and Clese Erikson, Director for Workforce Research at AAMC's Center for Workforce Studies.

    No conflicts of interest were disclosed.

    uC System Gets Gates Foundation Grant for School of Global Health

    UC wins $4M Gates grant to plan School of Global Health

    Sacramento Business Journal

    The University of California said Tuesday it got a $4 million grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to support planning for a potential systemwide UC School of Global Health.

    The proposed school, which the university envisions as training new leaders to help tackle global health issues, would be UC’s first multicampus, systemwide school, the university said.

    The San Francisco Business Times reported in mid-October that the Gates Foundation was rumored to be ready to make such a commitment to the Global Health School’s planning process.

    Efforts to launch the new UC global health school are being led, at least initially, by experts at UC San Francisco, including former UCSF Medical School Dean and former campus chancellor Haile Debas, M.D., now executive director of UCSF Global Health Sciences, and Sir Richard Feachem, a professor of global health at UCSF and UC Berkeley.

    Feachem was previously executive director of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

    Officials said the two-year grant of nearly $3.99 million will fund final planning efforts for the proposed global health school, “which is expected to seek UC Regents’ approval in 2010 and officially enroll students in summer 2011.”

    In the Dec. 2 statement, Debas said global health problems including issues such as migration, climate change and emerging pandemics “are, in California, local health problems that demand solutions” and that a UC school of global health would help the system provide a new framework to study and help solve them.

    The proposed multicampus program would feature “five or more” global health centers linking participating campuses and an administrative center on one of the 10 UC campuses, officials said. Although UCSF appears to be well situated to nab the administrative role, that’s far from certain at this point.

    The school would include UC faculty in areas such as health and biological sciences, social sciences, law, business and engineering. Other U.S. universities that are making significant investments in the global health niche include Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Duke, Emory, the University of Washington, Columbia, Brown and Montreal’s McGill University, among others.


    Chris Rauber is a staff writer at the San Francisco Business Times.

    Monday, December 1, 2008

    Interesting Discussion: Innovative Approaches to Financing Drugs for the Poor

    December 1, 2008
    Volume 86, Number 48
    pp. 33-40

    Providing Medicines For The Poor

    Two views on how the pharmaceutical industry can best meet the medical needs of impoverished people around the globe

    William Schulz

    Taking Aim Hæge Håtveit (left)
    Pfizer (right)
    Debaters Pogge (left), Leitner Professor of Philosophy & International Affairs at Yale University, contends that an option called the Health Impact Fund could provide medicines to the poor and improve global health; Hedger, executive managing director of international affairs at Pfizer, argues that today's intellectual patent system is providing solutions for global health needs.

    CARING FOR THE POOR, especially their medical needs, seems an eternal quest. In countries rich and poor around the globe, untold millions of people need lifesaving drugs and other medical treatments. This need often goes unmet, particularly in the developing world where tropical diseases most of the rest of us will never encounter ravage lives and communities. HIV/AIDS continues to be an especial burden there.

    In recent years, a growing chorus has called for the removal of patent protection on some drugs as a means of providing affordable treatments to the poor. Generic versions of patented medicines can be produced and sold for a fraction of the cost. The counterargument is that removing intellectual property rights will stifle innovation by taking away the monetary reward for risk-based R&D. Pharmaceutical companies, like all funders of innovation, must have a mechanism by which they recoup the enormous R&D costs that go into each new drug and other medical treatments.

    Now, Thomas W. Pogge, a professor of philosophy at Yale University, presents another approach, which he calls the Health Impact Fund. Such a fund, he claims, will provide medicines for the poor, reward innovation, and allow drug companies to recoup their costs. A counterargument, in favor of the intellectual property rights system in place in most of the developed world, comes from Philip Hedger, executive managing director of international affairs at Pfizer. He argues that there is demonstrable flexibility within the extant system to work on models and mechanisms that apply state-of-the-art technologies to tropical and other neglected diseases. The private sector, in concert with governments and charitable organizations throughout the world, he says, provide millions of people with lifesaving medicines at little or no cost.


    Pogge Point

    Treatments for HIV illustrate the dilemma between access to and innovation in medicines: Second-line therapies have dramatically reduced the burdens of HIV infection in affluent countries, but at a price of $800 to $1,500 per year, they are out of reach for the majority of people until the 20-year patents run out. We could insist on lower prices, but that would undermine the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop new medicines. By facilitating access we strangle innovation, and by stimulating innovation through strong patents we obstruct access for many people to new medicines they urgently need.

    This terrible dilemma can be avoided by introducing a new option: the Health Impact Fund (HIF). This publicly funded pay-for-performance mechanism would give pharmaceutical innovators the option to register any new product. They would promise to make it available at marginal cost wherever it is needed in exchange for annual reward payments based on the product's global health impact during its first 10 years. The reward payments would be a share of a massive annual payout, with each registered product receiving a share equal to its share of the assessed health impact of all registered products.

    After years of unusually high concern for global health, we still lack many of the innovations that matter most.

    HIF would foster innovation, especially against diseases concentrated among the poor: tuberculosis, malaria, and other tropical diseases. Such diseases are now neglected because innovators cannot recover their R&D costs from sales to the poor. But with the option of an alternative reward based on health impact, heretofore neglected diseases would become some of the most lucrative R&D opportunities.

    The fund would promote access to new medicines by limiting the price of any registered product to the lowest feasible cost of production and distribution. It would motivate registrants to ensure that their product is widely available, perhaps at even lower prices, and that it is competently prescribed and optimally used. Registrants are rewarded not for selling their product, but for making it effective toward improving global public health.

    HIF will provide optimal incentives only if potential registrants are assured that the rewards will actually be there in the decade following market approval. Core funding of HIF is therefore best guaranteed by a broad partnership of countries. If governments representing one-third of global income agreed to contribute just 0.03% of their gross national incomes, HIF could get started with $6 billion annually. This is a reasonable minimum because the high cost of developing new medicines requires large rewards and because the cost of health impact assessment should not consume too much of the annual budget. If HIF works well, it could be scaled up through increased allocations and accession of new funders. Governments would have the option of phased withdrawal over a 10-year period.

    HIF can be seen as an annual competition among innovators that ranges over all countries and diseases, with firms earning more money if their product has a larger impact on health. Health impact can be measured in terms of the number of quality-adjusted life years saved worldwide. The QALY metric is already extensively used by private and state insurers in determining prices for new drugs, so employing it in calculating HIF rewards is not a big leap. Taking as a benchmark the pharmaceutical arsenal before the registered medicine was introduced, HIF would estimate to what extent it has added to the length and quality of human lives. This estimate would be based on data from clinical trials, including pragmatic trials in real-life settings, on tracking randomly selected medicines to their end users, and on statistical analysis of sales data as correlated with data about the global burden of disease. These estimates would necessarily be rough, at least in the early years. But so long as any errors are random, or at least not exploitable by registrants, HIF incentives would be only minimally disturbed.

    With HIF so designed, innovators would register products that can reduce the global burden of disease most cost-effectively. Products with the largest health impact would make the most money, thereby creating exactly the right incentives for innovation. And because HIF would be an optional system, the rate of reward is certain to be reasonable. If rewards were too high, new registrants would enter and dilute the payments to all registrants. If profits were too low, the reward rate would naturally increase as firms would choose, for more of their new products, to exploit their patent-protected pricing powers instead of registering them with HIF. Competition would ensure that registered products are rewarded at a rate that is profitable for innovators and maximizes the effect of HIF.

    To be certain that HIF is cost-effective relative to other public health expenditures, one can stipulate a maximum reward rate; if one year's funds are not fully used, the remainder can be rolled over into future years. To reassure potential innovators, one can also add some protection against unreasonably low rewards.

    By creating incentives to provide important pharmaceutical innovations at low prices, HIF would easily pay for itself. Through lower drug prices, taxpayers would realize offsetting savings in national health systems, insurance premiums, and direct pharmacy purchases. They would benefit from reductions in counterfeiting, wasteful litigation, and excessive marketing. By stimulating development of important but currently unprofitable medicines, making new high-impact medicines much more widely accessible, and encouraging efforts to ensure that medicines are optimally used, HIF would greatly reduce the global burden of disease and thereby produce large medical cost savings and gains in economic productivity.

    For a much fuller account of how HIF would work and why it is needed, visit healthimpactfund.org.


    Hedger Point

    How can we stimulate innovation in the pharmaceutical industry without excluding the poor? Pharmaceutical innovation is benefiting patients in all socioeconomic environments. As new pharmaceutical and vaccine discoveries and innovations become available it is very important to find ways to ensure that patients the world over continue to benefit from such medical advances. The very high investment risk and funding required to support and stimulate this innovation is dependent on a system that can help ensure the prospect of a fair return on that investment. This assurance is largely provided through the intellectual property rights (IPR) system and patents in particular.

    Three questions arise. First, what is the evidence that the IPR system is benefiting the poor? And we can define "the poor" as those who are unable or almost unable to afford health care, including medicines, and who also often suffer from additional diseases that do not afflict populations in wealthy nations. Second, are there gaps in the innovation pipeline and research for diseases that especially afflict the poor? And third, is the IPR system mutually exclusive to other potential complementary sources of financial, regulatory, and legal stimulations that may promote further research into diseases that especially affect the poor?

    For the first question—What is the evidence that pharmaceutical innovation is reaching the poor?—three key perspectives are important. The first is the extent to which there is access to existing medicines and vaccines for a wide range of diseases and medical conditions. That access is mostly evidenced by the World Health Organization's Essential Drugs List of more than 300 safe, effective, and inexpensive medicines and vaccines. Most of these interventions were initially discovered or developed by the pharmaceutical industry and were patented products.

    The second perspective is the availability of interventions for diseases that mostly or exclusively affect the poor. There are, for example, treatments currently available for onchocerciasis, leprosy, trachoma, lymphatic filariasis, Guinea worm disease, schistosomiasis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. These pharmaceutical inventions and developments are available notwithstanding the fact that there is little or no commercial return on these products. The two exceptions are drugs to treat malaria and HIV/AIDS. Malaria treatments have a modest "traveler's market"—that is, prophylaxis for Western visitors to malaria-endemic countries, and HIV/AIDS treatments are reimbursed in industrialized nations. However, the vast majority of patients who need both antimalarials and antiretrovirals reside in countries where either the price of these drugs is very low or the drugs are provided free.

    The third perspective asks, What is the pipeline for new treatments and cures for diseases that mostly afflict the poor? In this category, pharmaceutical companies currently have R&D in Chagas disease, dengue fever, human African trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, leprosy, malaria, HIV/AIDS, onchocerciasis, and various soil-transmitted helminths.

    For the second question—Are there gaps in the innovation pipeline and research for diseases which especially afflict the poor?—the answer is yes. Despite the work cited above, there are some diseases for which the existing treatments are not optimal and a few for which interventions are nonexistent or inadequate. And these diseases pose additional and particular challenges to discovery and development of medicines and vaccines. Among them is designing and conducting clinical trials in less regulated environments because clinical trials can only be done where these diseases exist.

    These diseases are deserving of focus, resource, and sustained advocacy. Society has recognized that it cannot expect the pharmaceutical sector to have all the answers to these challenges. The need is too urgent, the cost is too great, the science is too complex. Recent years have therefore witnessed more funding, more focus, more advocacy, more innovative mechanisms and models, and the creation of various initiatives to add to the research pipeline for such diseases.

    Among these innovative mechanisms are disease-specific organizations that provide advocacy, access to medicines and vaccines, and product development, as well as research initiatives probing new interventions for tropical diseases. An example is the Medicines for Malaria Venture. This nonprofit organization focuses on developing new treatments for and access to drugs for malaria. It is funded by a mix of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and governments.

    Another example is the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative. This drug development organization was initiated by the charitable group Doctors Without Borders five years ago. It now attracts funding and technology from a range of public and private players and focuses on four neglected tropical diseases: human African trypanosomiasis, visceral leishmaniasis, Chagas disease, and malaria.

    Much of the funding for diseases of the developing world is genuinely new and incremental, coming from governments, NGOs, and foundations. There are also new mechanisms aimed at more sustained access to funding, such as additional revenue from airline taxes.

    There are also new models of R&D for these diseases set up by private pharmaceutical companies in developing countries. These are stand-alone research facilities dedicated to diseases of the poor.

    Other varied and innovative approaches to ensuring a focus on diseases that affect the poor include differential or tiered pricing mechanisms for drugs and vaccines by the private sector, voluntary licensing arrangements with generic drug companies in the developing world, advanced funding instruments, and technology-transfer agreements. And that is not the entire list. Often these initiatives involve academia, the private sector, NGOs, government institutions, foundations, and the public sector. This is society operating to protect the poor in a mutually supportive and unified way, as it should.

    The pharmaceutical sector is engaged directly or indirectly in virtually all these mechanisms and initiatives. And all of these initiatives are feeding off and supported by the essential innovation that is propelled by the basic intellectual property system, especially patents.

    Is the IPR system mutually exclusive to other, potentially complementary sources of stimulation for diseases that especially affect the poor? Of course not. Most of the mechanisms and initiatives outlined above are relatively new, and many complement and draw upon the technology, expertise, and innovation of the pharmaceutical sector.

    For example, Pfizer has provided its new class of HIV/AIDS entry inhibitor technology to the International Partnership for Microbicides under a royalty-free agreement. Under this agreement, Pfizer has provided the technology for the entry inhibitor and technical assistance so that it could be developed into a microbicide that would protect women from HIV infection.

    Pfizer also has an agreement with the Special Programme for Research & Training in Tropical Diseases under which Pfizer, TDR, and African scientists are analyzing compounds in Pfizer's molecular library to assess their utility for treating some of the tropical diseases that need better or new interventions. These are but two examples of many direct and partnering approaches that private, research-based biomedical companies are working on.

    There is debate, too, about potential new funding models and other types of fiscal and legal instruments and incentives that may support, accelerate, or sustain R&D for diseases that mainly affect the poor. Some believe that these would add even more to the arsenal of instruments and funding already laid out here. These may well have merit but need further careful analysis.

    This debate will continue, as it must, so that no one institution or government becomes complacent or ambivalent about the need for patient equity in receiving the benefits of biomedical innovation. However, the critical focus of the private sector is to continue to listen and consider additional viable, innovative ideas to ensure that existing medicines and technologies are available to the poor.


    Pogge Counterpoint

    In discussing his third question, Philip Hedger agrees that the existing IPR system is compatible with adding a supplementary reward mechanism such as HIF, which is optional for innovators. Focusing on Hedger's first and second questions, I will here substantiate the urgency of such an addition.

    On the first question, I agree that the poor have better access to medicines under the IPR system than if pharmaceutical innovation were not incentivized at all. But I argue that there would be much better access still if HIF were added to the IPR system.

    There is much room for improvement. Today, some 30% of all human deaths are from poverty-related causes. Many of these deaths could be averted through better access to better medicines that are routinely available to the affluent. For most people in the world, price is a serious obstacle to getting needed medicines. This problem is not confined to the developing world. Some 50 million Americans, mostly poor, lack health insurance, and many of them face painful choices when prescribed an expensive medicine. Increasingly, even the insured in affluent countries find that their insurer does not cover important, but expensive, medicines, or that insurance covers only a fraction of the cost. The British National Health Service recently caused an uproar by refusing to fund, at an annual cost per patient of $34,000–$60,000, four kidney cancer drugs, including Pfizer's Sutent.

    It is awful, of course, that lifesaving medicines cost so much, especially when they can be manufactured for a tiny fraction of this amount. But Hedger is right: Pharmaceutical innovators must make a sizable profit on marketing their medicine because they must cover the costs and risks of their R&D. Without such profits, commercial pharmaceutical innovation is simply unsustainable.

    HIF can help solve this dilemma. It would ensure that all HIF-registered drugs are available everywhere at the lowest feasible cost of production and distribution. And it would amply reward the development of such drugs on the basis of their global health impact. Such rewards are ultimately funded by taxpayers and, disproportionately, by the better-off. These same people are now funding different rewards for new medicines through high insurance premiums and high drug prices. So for them it makes little difference whether a new high-impact medicine is HIF-registered or rewarded through high prices.

    But this makes all the difference to the less affluent. They have a much better chance of getting access to a new drug when its price is low and when the innovator is paid for achieving health impact. By offering to reward important innovations differently, HIF would ensure—at little additional net cost—that getting new medicines to poor patients can be profitable. HIF provides a systemic, long-term solution to the innovation-access dilemma by providing rewards that pharmaceutical innovators can predict and count on.

    Hedger's second question is about gaps in today's pharmaceutical arsenal. Here, too, HIF would bring great gains over the IPR system as complemented by charitable initiatives.

    What gaps there are depends on the economic status of the patient, and Hedger's second question is therefore related to his first. Most advanced medicines today are so expensive that only a minority can get them. For the rest of humanity, these new medicines are as good as nonexistent—or worse, they are a degrading reminder that their health and survival is counted for less. To be sure, there are cheap medicines that poor people can afford. But these are often greatly inferior. Antimony (schistosomiasis) is toxic and melarsoprol (sleeping sickness) even kills 5% of users. Chloroquine (malaria) and acetaminophen (dengue fever) have little effect. Existing drug cocktails for tuberculosis require compliance over many months. And first-line AIDS treatments simply don't work for many patients. HIF makes new high-impact medicines accessible for all.

    I share Hedger's admiration for the great efforts that have been made in recent years to develop much-needed new medicines. These wonderful initiatives, including Pfizer's sharing of its microbicide technology, are making a real difference to new drug development and access. But this welcome addition to the IPR system depends on a continuing flow of favorable funding decisions. We have just entered a global financial crisis that is likely to curb the charitable endeavors of companies, governments, foundations, and individuals for years to come. Moreover, patterns of advocacy and giving fluctuate and may not be focused on the diseases that can be reduced most cost-effectively. A treaty-backed systemic solution, the HIF reliably rewards innovators in good times and bad. It rewards performance—health impact—and thereby focuses innovators on the most cost-effective ways of promoting global public health.

    After years of unusually high concern for global health, we still lack many of the innovations that matter most. We have no drug for Ebola, for instance. Or consider that since the generic rifabutin in 1975, no new drug has been introduced for tuberculosis (Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 2001, 163, 1055). The long and cumbersome regimen associated with the old TB drugs has contributed to poor compliance, which has eroded their effectiveness and spawned new multi- and extremely drug-resistant strains of the disease—MDR and XDR TB—that now pose great dangers to us all. Tuberculosis kills some 1.7 million people each year, more than any other communicable disease save AIDS. We urgently need new medicine for TB.

    HIF is an extremely cost-effective innovation stimulator. This is so because it lets innovators compete in realizing health impact. Even more important is that HIF, by funding a drug's development expenses differently, multiplies the social benefit of any such R&D investment. To illustrate, think of cases like those kidney cancer drugs. Suppose an annual supply of such a drug costs $1,000 to manufacture and deliver when it is sold to 5,000 patients worldwide at $51,000 each. Here the innovator makes $250 million annually toward recovering its R&D expenses. If such a drug were HIF-registered, and therefore cheap and its impact rewarded, it might reach 100,000 patients while being priced at $300 (thanks to economies of scale in manufacturing and distribution).

    The innovator of such a drug would register it only if the expected annual health-impact reward were at least $250 million. Paid by taxpayers worldwide, this reward expense would be largely offset by taxpayer savings: lower medical expenses and insurance premiums when 5,000 patients each get the drug for $300 rather than for $51,000. And there would be enormous further gains to the public, as the drug also reaches 95,000 poorer patients who would otherwise have been excluded. This low-cost gain to the public cannot be realized without HIF. Poor people cannot pay high prices, and setting a lower price only for the poor is difficult: One cannot realistically expect that a country's wealthy, well-connected citizens will pay $51,000 for medicine that their poor compatriots can get for $300. So in practice, innovators charge a high price to all and hope that charities will help at least some poor people to gain access.

    With Hedger, I welcome any effort to examine and discuss how to supplement the IPR system. Potentially an amazing opportunity, HIF certainly deserves constructive scrutiny. But its great potential will be realized only if we proceed beyond debate and refinement to implementation. Health care is firmly on the public agenda in many countries, and HIF has a genuine chance of becoming a reality.


    Hedger Counterpoint

    Thomas Pogge makes a thoughtful and helpful contribution to the global debate regarding access to biomedical technology. The fundamental premise—that additional, sustained, and focused funding may help spur investment in neglected diseases—is, at first glance, attractive.

    His proposal, however, is cast in rather binary and general terms, and some of the key arguments used in support of HIF are less than robust. It asserts that "by facilitating access we strangle innovation, and by stimulating innovation through strong patents we obstruct access for many people to new medicines they urgently need." The history of and data relating to HIV/AIDS do not support this assertion. In addition, using malaria as an example of lack of innovation and access does not fit well with the premise.

    Society has recognized that it cannot expect the pharmaceutical sector to have all the answers to these challenges.

    When the virus that causes AIDS was identified, AIDS was a neglected disease as there were no pharmacological interventions available. Today, the medicines are so effective that HIV/AIDS is effectively now a chronic disease, with a significant quiver of first- and second-line drugs approved and in use around the globe. Furthermore, some 80 new compounds are at varying stages of development. The private sector is responsible for development of these medicines. In addition, where access to poor populations is restricted, it is primarily due to barriers that bear little relationship to the cost of the drugs. First-line drugs are now generally less than 5% of the initial price of such medicines.

    By contrast, and after several years and hundreds of millions of dollars, neither the private sector nor NGOs dedicated to developing a vaccine against HIV/AIDS have yet been successful. This would argue that patents (and they have to be "strong" to have any value) have provided the stimulus that the private sector requires to discover and develop new medicines. The vaccines story to date also shows that other models—even when well funded and having access to skilled scientists and clinicians—are still subject to the vagaries and challenges of science.

    It is a similar case with malaria. Despite the minimal nature of the commercial market for malaria drugs, new compounds have been developed and brought to market, and there is a considerable amount of R&D activity within the private sector, among NGOs, and with collaborative private/NGO models.

    So far as the specifics of the HIF approach are concerned, there are basic imponderables about the operating principles and assumptions that underpin the approach. And here are just a few:

    • How would innovation be defined and by whom? For example, many key medical interventions are the result of incremental innovation, rather than breakthrough science. Society and governments are tending to mark down the value of incremental innovation, despite clear evidence of its value and necessity.

    • Many barriers to access exist other than financial incentives, especially in the countries for which the HIF products are targeted. Poor infrastructure, poor or nonexistent regulatory systems, lack of skilled health care workers, inadequate distribution systems, and challenging clinical-trial capabilities are among these.

    • The sustainability of a government-funded reward system has various areas of uncertainty. Governments change, as do their objectives and their funding mandates. Totally unpredicted issues can arise, as the world is currently witnessing. These and more reasons provide plenty of opportunity for governments to review their commitments, whatever the nature of the original agreement.

    • The proposed financial structure and the nature of measuring the value of the invention are problematic. Essentially, companies would be asked to take the risk of investing up front, assuming that the invention would be deemed to be innovative, would pass some criteria based on quality-adjusted life years—which themselves have been the subject of criticism (J. Med. Ethics 1989, 15, 148)—and that governments would honor their commitments 10 years hence. Then there is the question of the net present value of the funds some years hence.

    There are other more general points relating to the HIF concept, such as the appetite among donor countries for another major funding commitment, especially in the current global economic environment. Another significant consideration is the fact that a model of this nature has not been attempted in this or any other sector as far as can be seen. As a result there is no basic proof of concept, and this may also be a deterrent to donor states.

    As I noted previously, there are a significant number of public- private partnerships, NGOs, and private-sector programs that are working on many of these important tropical diseases. They vary in many ways, including the models employed for funding and operating the organizations. They are producing meaningful scientific results. It could be that an approach modeled on HIF could be set up to support the ongoing funding and operations of these product development organizations. Perhaps too, a component of such a fund could address the pull through of those new medicines, diagnostics, and vaccines, so that regulatory, distribution, and other barriers that impede getting these new lifesaving treatments to the patients who need them are minimized.

    Certainly, the challenges of science, regulation, product approval, distribution and logistics, health care worker availability, and other such impediments to serving patients with hard-to-treat diseases deserves a continued focus by society. Academia, the public and private sector, and governments must continue to search for the most effective ways to work together to meet these critical challenges.